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SUMMARY 
 
China’s rapid growth and deepening global presence creates a major 
challenge for the conventional wisdom of industrialisation as a core 
component of development strategy. These challenges are expressed through 
a combination of  direct impacts (expressed in bilateral country-to-country 
relations) and indirect impacts (reflected in competition in third country 
markets). In current structures, these impacts are predominantly harmful for 
SSA’s industrial growth, as expressed through its recent experience in the 
exports of clothing to the US under AGOA. If Washington Consensus policies 
prevail, these harmful impacts will be sustained and deepened. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Industrialisation is widely seen as being central to the development challenge. 
This basic axiom follows in part from observed historical reality - high per 
capita incomes are closely associated with economies intensive in industrial 
activities. There are also sound analytical reasons why industrialisation should 
be favoured as a strategic development objective – industry is characterised 
by rapid technological change and productivity growth; there are important 
technological and learning spillovers in and from industry; and the terms of 
trade have (historically, at least) turned against commodities and in favour of 
manufactures. Moreover, the promotion of industry also has strategic 
implications (military systems require a supportive industrial structure to be 
effective) and promotes rational class-based political discourse at the 
expense of ethnic (and often millenarian) belief systems. 
 
From the 1950s, the state playing a key role in emerging economies in 
promoting structural change from the primary sector to industry. Particularly in 
India and China lessons were explicitly drawn from the Soviet experience 
during the 1930s, and incentive systems were put into place favouring inward-
oriented import-substituting industrialisation. This policy framework was 
replicated in Africa as decolonisation rolled through the continent during the 
1950s, 1960s and 1970s. However, after the mid-1970s a revised orthodoxy 
emerged, still favouring industrial growth, but promoting this through an 
external focus, and a sweeping away of the state, both as a direct participant 
in production and as a facilitator and regulator of the growth of productive 
activities. 
 
This industrial policy agenda evolved through a stable period of global 
hegemony, with the historically-industrialised and capitalist north not only 
driving systems of global governance, but increasingly also the political and 
economic agendas within countries. However, by the turn of the millennium it 
was becoming increasingly clear that this hegemonic agenda would be 
challenged by the rise of two very large Asian economies, China and India. 
These two economies are increasingly referred to as the Asian Drivers, not 
just because they are very large and have a “big country effect”, but also 
because they comprise (at least by hypothesis) distinctive social and political 
actors (open.ac.uk/asiandrivers/; Kaplinsky and Messner, 2008). 
 
Potentially, the Asian Driver economies provide a disruptive presence, 
shaping the trajectory of the 21st century global economy. This is like the 
previous era of rapid Asian growth during the last third of the 20th century. For 
at no time did the combined population of Japan and Korea exceed more than 
four percent of the global total. Yet China alone accounts for around 20 
percent of global population, and in 2006 it became the largest emitter of 
greenhouse gases. India follows on closely behind, not just also growing 
rapidly, but projected to have an even larger population than China by 2030. It 
is thus highly unlikely that the global political economy can absorb rapid Asian 
Driver growth and globalisation without a severe disruption to accepted 
developmental axioms, including with respect to the desirability and feasibility 
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of industrialisation. Moreover, their size and trajectory means that this impact 
will be felt worldwide, including in SSA.  
 
In this paper we examine the ways in which China’s rapid advance as an 
exporter of manufactures may affect the developmental agenda in SSA 
promoting industrialisation. Because this is a rapidly changing tableau at an 
early stage of development, the analysis which follows will to some extent 
inevitably be conjectural, and evidencing of the emerging impact will 
necessarily be uneven. We begin with a brief overview discussion of the ways 
in which the Asian Driver economies might have an impact on SSA (Section 
2), and then look briefly at SSA’s performance in manufacturing (Section 3). In 
Section 4 we examine the  emerging evidence on China’s impact on 
domestically-focused industrial activity, complementing this in Section 5 with a 
focus on SSA’s nascent outward-oriented industrial development, before 
drawing general conclusions in Section 6. 
 
2. A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF CHINA ON SSA 
 
It is important to set in context the analysis of China’s impact on SSA’s 
industrialisation. This is partly because the links to African industrialisation are 
complex and arise from a variety of interactions between China and Africa, 
and China and the global economy. But it is also because China’s presence in 
Africa is much more coordinated than that of previously hegemonic northern 
powers. Thus, whereas western aid tends to be relatively distant from its 
commercial interests, in China’s case there is much less light showing 
between these two channels of interaction.  
 
An overview of China’s links with SSA distinguishes different channels of 
impact transmission, the distinction between complementary and competitive 
impacts, and between direct and indirect impacts (for more detail see 
Kaplinsky, 2007) 
 
Channels of interaction 
There are a variety of different channels through which individual countries 
interact with other economies, in their regions and elsewhere. Clearly, these 
channels are contingent – they change over time, and vary in importance 
depending on factors such as location, resource endowment, trade links, and 
geo-strategic significance. Six key channels stand out in importance: 
 
• through trade links  
• through investment flows (FDI and portfolio investments) 
• through aid 
• in institutions of global government 
• through flows of people (including migrants) 
• through environmental spillovers 
 
Complementary and competitive impacts 
In each of these channels of interaction, we can observe a mix of 
complementary and competitive impacts. For example, with regard to trade, 
the Asian Drivers may both provide cheap inputs and consumer goods to 
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SSA, and be a market for SSA’s exports. On the other hand, imports from the 
Asian Drivers can readily displace local producers. In relation to FDI, the 
Asian Drivers may be a direct source of inward FDI into SSA and perhaps 
crowd-in FDI into SSA from third countries as parts of extended global value 
chains. These are complementary impacts. But the Asian Drivers may also 
compete with other economies for global FDI. The rising power of the Asian 
Drivers in a western dominated global governance system may strengthen the 
voice of developing countries in international organizations. The emerging 
conflicts between the Asian Drivers, the US and Europe on energy, resources 
and markets might also marginalise development policy issues in word 
politics.  Similarly, financial flows environmental spillovers and migration may 
be either complementary or competitive. 
 
The key element of these interactions is the “for whom” component. Countries 
may be affected differentially – in some cases, for example, the export of 
fabrics from the Asian Drivers to SSA may feed productively into a vibrant 
clothing and textile value chain; in other cases, it may displace a country’s 
exports and production for the domestic market. But these effects are not just 
felt at the national and economy-wide level. They affect groups within 
countries differentially. For example, cheap clothing imports from China may 
displace clothing and textile workers, but cheapen wage goods and hence 
reduce wage costs for producers in other sectors (which is indeed what has 
been occurring in many high-income economies during the early years of the 
21st Century). These impacts on a complementary-competitive axis may also 
change over time, and most importantly, they will vary for different classes, 
regions and groups within economies. 
 
Direct and indirect effects 
The complementary-competitive axis of impacts is readily comprehended and 
widely recognised. Less widely acknowledged is the distinction between direct 
and indirect impacts. In part this is because the indirect impacts are difficult to 
measure. Indirect impacts occur in third country markets and institutions. For 
example, China’s trade with the US may open or foreclose the opportunities 
for SSA economies to export into that market. Similarly, China’s high savings 
rate has had the effect of lowering global interest rates, indirectly facilitating 
investment in SSA. As in the case of the complementary/competitive access, 
the impact of the direct and indirect impacts can be gauged either at the 
country level, or at intra-national levels, for example with regard to different 
regions, sectors, classes and genders. (As we shall see below in Section 5, in 
many cases the indirect impacts may in fact be much more significant than 
the direct ones). 
 
Figure 1 summarises this framework for assessing the impact of China on 
SSA, both as a general phenomenon and in relation to particular sectors, 
such as the industrial sector addressed in this paper. 
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Figure 1. A framework for assessing the impact of China on SSA 
 
Impacts 
Complementary Competitive 
 
Channel 
Direct Indirect Direct Indirect 
Trade     
Investment     
Aid     
Global governance     
Migrants     
Environment     
 
 
3. SSA’S MANUFACTURING PERFORMANCE: A BRIEF OVERVIEW1 
 
In recent years, the African continent has seen revived growth. The sources of 
this growth are not yet clear, but a sound conjecture is that at least in some 
part this is due to the post-2000 boom in commodity prices. In turn, this 
commodity price boom is closely linked to the voracious demand of China for 
imported inputs used in the construction of infrastructure and in its expansion 
of manufactured exports. China’s share of global demand for the main base 
metals (aluminium, copper, iron ore, nickel, steel and zinc) grew from seven-
teen percent of global demand in 1993 to 20–25 percent in 2003 (Kaplinsky, 
2005). In the case of steel, its share has grown from less than 10 percent in 
1990 to more than 25 percent in 2003, equivalent to three times that of Japan, 
and more than either the EU or the US (around 20 percent each) (ibid). This 
expansion in Chinese commodity imports was associated with – and arguably 
was a primary cause of – the increased price of these hard commodities. 
(Kaplinsky, 2008). 
 
Yet, despite this rapid economic growth, there has been little change in 
economic structure in the continent. Manufacturing value added (MVA) as a 
share of gross domestic product is not only much lower than in the rest of the 
world (including in many developing economies), but its share remained 
unchanged between 1996 and 2004 (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Share of MVA in GDP (At Constant 1995 Prices) (%) 
 
 1995 2000 2004a 
Africab 12.1 12.3 12.1 
China 34.7 36.7 39 
India 16.3 15.7 15.0 
Developing Group excl China 19.2 20 20.4 
WORLD 19.8 20.1 19.9 
 
Source: UNIDO International Year Book 2006 
a Estimate 
b For Africa and not SSA.  
                                            
1  For more detail on SSA’s manufacturing performance, see Kaplinsky and Morris, 2008. 
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Consistent with the boom in commodity prices, and reflecting in large part the 
pressure of Washington Consensus institutions to force SSA out of its inward 
focus, Africa’s recent growth spurt has been associated with a sharp increase 
in its external orientation. Table 2 shows a sharp change in direction towards 
outward orientation, particularly with regard to exports. Between 1998 and 
2004, SSA’s exports grew at a rate 50 percent higher than global exports.  
 
Table 2. Average Annual Growth Rates of Merchandise exports and 
imports (%) 
 
 1990-1997 1998-2004 
 Exports Imports Exports Imports
World 8.1 7.7 8.8 9.0 
SSA 4.4 6.0 12.5 8.1 
China 17.1 15.8 21.4 26.5 
India 11.7 10.5 13.8 14.5 
 
Source: Calculated from UNCTAD (www.unctad.org) accessed in January 2007 
 
How did SSA’s manufacturing exports perform in this export boom? At face 
value, export-oriented manufacturing performed at a stellar level, more than 
doubling between 1990 and 2005, from $5.7bn to $12.5bn. However, this 
impressive headline growth needs to be adjusted in some key respects. First, 
the largest component was unset diamonds, accounting for exports of $5.5bn. 
Second, there were significant “exports” of “railway/tramway” equipment from 
Liberia ($1.3bn in 2005, virtually entirely ships) and Senegal (£100m in 2005, 
virtually entirely aircraft). However, a closer look at the data shows that both 
these economies were in trade deficit in both trade classifications. Their 
“exports” thus represent re-exports to the region. Third, included in this “broad 
manufactures” category” are also methanol exports from Equatorial Guinea 
which is effectively a petroleum export, and uranium from Namibia and Niger. 
If we net out these items from the “broad manufactures category” we obtain a 
narrower classification of “narrow manufactures”. 
 
Focusing on these narrow manufactures, and excluding South Africa from the 
picture (since South Africa is a very special case in the African context), the 
value of SSA’s manufacturing exports was not $5.7bn but $2.2bn in 1990, and 
$4.6bn rather than $12.5bn in 2005. Crucially, clothing and textiles accounted 
for a combined total of 53 per cent of all “narrow manufactures” exports from 
SSA excluding South Africa in 2005, and this had risen from 42 percent in 
1990. (The share of low-tech and labour-intensive clothing rose from 33 to 50 
percent, and that of higher-tech and capital-intensive textiles fell from 9 to 2.6 
percent). The next most significant “narrow manufactures” exports was 
corkwood manufactures (almost entirely veneer sheets) (9.4 percent), 
followed by iron and steel products and leather manufactures. 
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4. CHINA’S EMERGING IMPACT ON SSA’S INWARD-ORIENTED 
INDUSTRIALISATION 
 
Unfortunately, there is a vacuum of research on the impact of Chinese-
sourced imports on the domestically-oriented industrial sector in SSA and we 
are limited to a few research fragments which are suggestive of an impact 
rather than providing detailed insights into the extent and nature of these 
impacts. 
 
In Zambia the trades unions assert that imports of Chinese clothes have 
undermined the clothing and electrical sector, and in Nigeria trades unions 
blame Chinese imports for the loss of 350,000 jobs 
(http://www.nzherald.co.nz/). This latter figure is clearly fictional of the degree 
of impact, but nevertheless Chinese-sourced imports have displaced 
employment in these sectors in both of these countries. For example, an 
embarrassing incident during President Hu Jintao’s visit to Zambia as part of 
his tour around SSA in early 2007 was the closure of the Mulungushi textile 
factory and the loss of more than 1,000 jobs. This was a direct result of 
competitive imports from China, and, ironically, led to the closure of a textiles 
factory which the Chinese had built  and supported with great fanfare in the 
1970s. 
 
In Ethiopia, although competition from Chinese shoe imports has led to an 
upgrading of processes and design by many domestic firms, it has 
simultaneously had a negative impact on employment and domestic output. A 
study of 96 micro-, small and medium domestic producers reported that as a 
consequence of Chinese competition, 28 percent were forced into bankruptcy, 
and 32 percent downsized activity. The average size of microenterprises fell 
from 7 to 4.8 employees, and of SMEs, from 41 to 17 (Egziabher, 2006),  
 
In South Africa, imports from China grew from 16.5 percent of total clothing 
imports in 1995 to 74.2 percent in 2005 (all data in this and the following 
paragraph from Morris, 2007). Including imports from Hong Kong, China-
sourced clothing were 78.8 percent of total clothing imports in 2005. The 
expansion of clothing imports was associated with a period of rapid decline in 
formal sector manufacturing in both clothing and textiles. In clothing, 
employment fell from 97,958 in 2004 to 78,694 in 2006, and in textiles from 
21,380 in 2003 to 16,800 in 2005. Morris cautions that this over-estimates the 
extent of employment loss, since at the same time there is evidence that the 
informal clothing sector grew rapidly. However, wages and job security in the 
informal sector are much inferior to the formal sector, suggesting a period of 
wage compression during this period of import expansion from China.  
 
In an important observation – often ignored in discussions of industrial policy 
– Morris highlights the welfare impact of increased imports from China. 
Between 2000 and 2005, whilst the overall price index increased by 30 
percent, that of clothing fell by five percent. Significantly, as in the case of the 
Ethiopian shoe industry, competition from Chinese manufactures forced local 
manufacturers to upgrade their competitiveness. As Table 3 shows, price 
deflation occurred both with regard to imports and locally produced apparel, 
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and was reflected in both lower consumer prices and lower costs to the 
retailer. 
 
Table 3: Changes in retail price by major retailer for imported and locally 
produced clothing products, 2004-2006. 
 
 Imports Locally produced 
Number of sectors 65 27 
% categories experiencing price deflation 61.5% 29.3% 
% categories experiencing price inflation 23.1% 22.2% 
% categories experiencing no change 15.4% 18.5% 
Average % price change -16.8% -7.3% 
 
Source: Morris, 2007. 
 
The Chinese government is of course sensitive to the negative impact of its 
manufactured exports on SSA’s industrial sector, and announced a series of 
initiatives designed to promote African industry. For example, in 2006 it 
publicised a planned investment package of $300m in Zambia, to include 
$100m in a “high-tech” economic zone manufacturing TVs, mobile phones 
and other electronic items (Centre for Chinese Studies, 22 June 2007). 
Reflecting pressure from the Chinese government, China’s Shaoxing Textile 
Company announced a plan to build a $50m textile park in Nigeria (Centre for 
Chinese Studies, China Briefing, 15th June 2007). How successful these 
intentions will be is a different matter, since in the context of Washington 
Consensus policies on trade liberalisation, these proposed industrial 
investments will need to survive in a hostile global economic environment, 
facing competitive pressures from a range of producers, including firms based 
in China. 
 
So much for the impact of Chinese exports on SSA’s inward-focused 
manufacturing sector. But what about the impact on intra-continental trade in 
manufactures? As in the case of SSA’s manufacturing sector, there is a 
dearth of data on intra-continental trade. But, working with COMTRADE trade 
data, it is possible to compare the technological profile of intra-SSA trade in 
manufactures with SSA’s trade with the external world (Table 4). What 
emerges from this is that Africa’s exports to China are predominantly primary 
commodities and simple resource-based products, to an even greater extent 
than its exports to the rest of the world. However, it is significant that SSA’s 
internal trade in manufactures is much more technology intensive than either 
its trade with China or the rest of the world, and that this technological 
intensity grew in the 1995-2005 period (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2008). We will 
return to the significance of this in the concluding section of this paper. 
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Table 4: Technological Intensity of SSA’s trade: Share of exports 
comprising different categories of products, 2005 (%). 
 
 World (excl. China, India) China Intra-SSA 
Primary 
Commodities 67 81 17 
Resource Based 16 15 35 
Low Technology 4 1 13 
Medium Technology 9 2 23 
High Technology 1 0.1 5 
 
Source: Calculated from COMTRADE (Accessed through http://wits.worldbank.org) in 
January 2007 
Technological-intensity taxonomy derived from Lall (2000). 
 
5. CHINA’S EMERGING IMPACT ON SSA’S OUTWARD-ORIENTED 
INDUSTRIALISATION 
 
As we saw in Section 3 above, more than half of SSA’s manufactured exports 
(excluding South Africa) were clothing and textiles, and almost all of this was 
clothing. Moreover, clothing and textiles are widely considered as a first 
learning step in the ladder of technology capability-building in industry. 
Therefore, SSA’s export performance in the clothing and sectors provides an 
important window into its export oriented manufacturing growth-trajectory, not 
just in the past but also for the future. 
 
AGOA and the ending of the MFA 
SSA’s clothing and textile exports have grown very rapidly since the mid-
1990s, when it began to export to the external world. (Prior to this only South 
Africa had been a clothing exporter, but exclusively in niche0markets such as 
men’s woollen suits, Joffe,et.al, 1995). The growth of these exports speeded 
up after the turn of the millennium, mostly as a result of the US’s African 
Growth and Opportunities Act introduced in 2001. This gave significant 
incentives for SSA exporters of manufactured goods, providing not just tariff 
preferences, but allowing low-income SSA clothing exporters to side-step 
rules of origin regulations and to utilise duty-free textiles sourced from China 
and other low-cost producers. The consequence of this AGOA scheme was a 
very rapid growth in clothing exports from low-income Kenya, Lesotho and 
Swaziland, complementing clothing exports from established producers in 
Madagascar, Mauritius and South Africa. As Table 5 shows, these exports 
were considerable. In Lesotho they comprised all of manufactured exports 
and were equivalent to 50 percent of the value of its GDP. In Kenya, 
employment in export processing zone clothing firms comprised the 
equivalent of 20 percent of all formal sector manufacturing employment. 
 
Table 5. Global exports and share of US in exports of major SSA 
clothing and textile exporting economies 
 
 Country Year 
Exports $ 
‘000 
US 
Share 
(%) 
AGOA as Share of 
Exports to US (%) 
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2000 78,000 89.6 NA Kenya 2005 306,000 95.3 98.5 
2000 154,000 94.9 NA Lesotho 2005 406,000 96.5 99.4 
2000 633,000 18.9 NA Madagascar 2005 771,000 37.0 98.5 
2000 1,652,000 16.3 NA Mauritius 2005 1,384,000 12.4 85.8 
2000 867,000 31.0 NA South Africa 2005 571,000 33.8 64.8 
2000 56,000 88.4 NA Swaziland 2005 171,000 99.4 99.0 
 
Source: UNSD COMTRADE database, accessed via World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) 
23 January  2007; Country and sectoral data calculated on the basis of US imports; 
For share of AGOA, for 2001, Gibbon, 2003; for 2004- 2005 values www.agoa.info 
accessed 19th March 2007 
 
This growth in SSA clothing exports was not only a result of AGOA. They also 
reflected a system for the regulation of global trade in clothing and textiles, 
stretching back to the 1950s when Japan’s clothing industry first began to 
threaten US producers. This involved a complex system of quantitative quotas 
which limited the number of items which individual countries could export to 
North America and the EU. Since Asian producers rapidly filled their quotas, 
they took advantage of unused quota allocations in SSA and located some of 
their production in the six major SSA exporting countries listed in Table 5 
above. 
 
However, after many years of negotiation, the last quotas were removed at 
the beginning of 2005.2 This meant that even though Chinese clothing 
exporters to the US were penalised with higher tariffs, there was no longer a 
physical limit on the number of items which they could export into that market. 
The consequence for SSA’s clothing and textile sector – bear in mind that this 
was 50 percent of total non-South African SSA manufactured exports in 2005 
– has been very severe. As Table 6 shows, the result was that in the first two 
years after quota removal, SSA’s clothing exports to the US fell by 26 percent. 
The impact on Mauritius and South Africa (who, because of their high per 
capita incomes were unable to utilise duty-free fabrics from China in their 
AGOA exports) was even more severe. At the same time, and comparing like-
for-like products, Chinese exports into the US grew by 85 percent, on the 
back of a halving of unit prices. 
 
                                            
2  In fact, despite the agreed removal of quotas, the surge of Chinese clothing exports 
to both the EU and the US led to the reimposition of some temporary “China 
Safeguard” quotas. In June 2005, the EU and China reached an agreement that 
limited 10 categories of Chinese textiles exports to the EU to between 8 and 12.5 
percent growth above a specified base period for the next three years.  In December 
2005, the US and Chinese trade representatives agreed to a three-year agreement 
reducing US imports of Chinese textile and apparel products in all or parts of 34 
sensitive categories 
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Table 6: Change in value of clothing exports to the US, 2004, 2005 and 
2006 (%) 
 
 2005/2004 2006/2005 2006/04 
Change in Unit Price 
of top 10 products  
2005/04 
 SSA China SSA China SSA China SSA China 
AGOA -16.5 56.9 -11.2 17.8 -25.9 84.8 -0.9 -46 
Kenya -2.5 77.8 -2.7 18.7 -5.1 112.9 -1.9 -45 
Lesotho -14.3 110.8 -0.9 28.5 -15.1 170.9 -3.2 -46 
Madagascar -14.4 72.2 -13.9 21.0 -26.3 108.3 -9.5 -44 
Mauritius -26.4 73.2 -28.7 17.9 -47.6 104.2 -4.6 -45 
Swaziland -9.9 93.3 -16.0 22.1 -24.3 136.1 -2.7 -52 
S Africa -43.7 63.9 -17.0 15.4 -53.3 89.1 3.0 -33 
 
Source: Calculated from http://dataweb.usitc.gov data, accessed on 19th March 2007 
a Unit prices calculated for top 10 products in 2004 for each AGOA country’s exports 
 
Not just clothing, but also furniture 
This adverse impact of China on SSA’s clothing and textile exports is mirrored 
in the timber and furniture sector. This, as we saw in Section 3 above, was the 
second most significant manufactured export from SSA (excluding South 
Africa), predominantly from West Africa. Preliminary research in this sector 
suggest that China and other newly dynamic Asian Driver economies are 
severely threatening the growth of competences in the value adding wood 
products sectors by undermining exports and the learning derived from 
exporting. For example, in 2005, Europe’s major importer of garden furniture 
ceased sourcing from South Africa and Ghana, and divested itself of its joint 
venture equity in Ghana’s major furniture exporting firm. Imports were 
switched to Vietnam and China. There is a single reason for this – SSA is not 
price competitive. In 2005, the same garden furniture product imported from 
South Africa at £60, could be obtained for £50 from Ghana, £38 from Vietnam 
and only £30 from China (Interviews). By contrast, China’s furniture industry 
has been booming. Between 1993 and 2002 it moved from being the world’s 
eighth largest to the second largest exporter. In the face of this inability to 
compete with Asia in general and China in particular, SSA’s furniture 
manufacturers are moving backwards into their resource sectors, exporting 
raw logs, chips for the paper industry, and sawn timber. There is also 
probably a significant trade in illegally-logged hardwoods from West and 
Central Africa to Asia, but this is by its nature very difficult to evidence. Much 
of this SSA-sourced timber is used by Asian manufacturers to produce 
furniture which displaces SSA from global furniture markets.3  
 
This evidence on China’s impact on SSA’s clothing, textile and timber-based 
exports is thus suggestive of both a competitive and indirect impact. However, 
                                            
3  This echoes the experience of Thailand, whose furniture industry suffered from 
Chinese competition in the Japanese market. Having developed this market for a new 
type of wood (historically rubber-wood had not been used for furniture), Thai 
producers found their market eroded by rubber-wood exports from China, using a 
combination of Thai and Indonesian rubber wood imports (Mitsuhashi, 2006). 
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in one particular respect it might be argued that the impact is positive. This is 
because as a consequence of the rules of origin derogation for low income 
SSA exporters under AGOA, clothing exporters in Kenya, Lesotho and 
Swaziland have been able to utilise fabrics sourced from China on a duty-free 
basis. In 2005, fabric imports from China were equal in value to more than 90 
percent of all of SSA’s clothing exports, and this had risen from less than 20 
percent in 2005 (COMTRADE, accessed through http://wits.worldbank.org) on 
23rd March 2007). 
 
The dynamics of global value chains 
This indirect impact on SSA of Chinese exports to the US is readily visible, 
and has been the source of some concern in policy circles, so that the 
planned abolition in AGOA in 2006 of the derogation on rules of origin 
(allowing low income SSA economies to utilise duty free fabrics from China) 
was put off until 2011 (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2008). However, there is a 
further indirect impact of China on SSA’s existing and potential exports of 
manufactures which is more nuanced in nature but potentially of considerable 
significance. To comprehend the nature of this challenge it is necessary to 
digress briefly and to focus on the evolution of global value chain dynamics. 
Global value chains are important since it has become increasingly clear that 
a country’s ability to participate in global markets does not only reflect the 
competences of its producers, but also the mechanisms whereby they are 
connected to global markets. 
 
The neo-classical conception of trade is that it involves the arms-length 
exchange of goods and services between unrelated parties, each seeking to 
maximise profits. Transactions are one-off and anonymous, and neither party 
is of sufficient size or influence to affect the prices and conditions of exchange 
which are instead determined by conditions of supply and demand. The rise of 
vertically integrated corporations, which grew to significance from the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century (Chandler, 1977), increasingly operating 
across national boundaries, both reinforces and undermines this conception 
of specialisation and trade. On the one hand they challenge the small-firm-
price-taker assumption. But, on the other hand, they show how when trust-
based relationships are important, these tend to be removed from market 
exchanges. The market may thus remain the repository of anonymity, 
 
Transaction costs theory argues that firms internalise market-based relations 
for a combination of two reasons (Williamson, 1985). First, they do so when 
the costs of communication with customers and suppliers are higher than the 
supervision costs of controlling intra-firm operations. And, second, assets 
required to produce inputs may be very specific, so that the firm needs to 
protect itself from the dangers of opportunistic behaviour from its suppliers. 
When these two conditions apply, it pays the firm to take over – and own - the 
production of key inputs or to control the destination of key outputs.  
 
What transactions costs theory did not absorb is that there an increasingly 
attractive third option has emerged, sitting between arms-length impersonal 
market relations and internalised (and increasingly foreign-owned) direct 
investment. This enables firms to meet the needs of discerning customers and 
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to draw on the distinctive competences of specialised suppliers (and buyers) 
without incurring the coordination costs of direct ownership. The key to this is 
for the firm to develop long-term and obligational high trust relationships with 
key suppliers (and customers) which protect the firm from opportunistic 
behaviour. Then, by adding to this structured supply chain management 
programmes in which they work with suppliers (and customers) to enhance 
capabilities, the firm is able to ensure the systemic efficiency of the chain as a 
whole (competence trust).  
 
It is these non-internalised but repeated and “personal” relationships between 
different firms in a production and distribution chain which are referred to as 
value chains; where they cross national borders, they are referred to as global 
value chains (Gereffi, 1994; Kaplinsky and Morris, 2001; Gereffi, 2005). By 
necessity, these are coordinated chains of production, subject to hierarchical 
forms of governance, and thus characterised by power asymmetries which 
determine the division of labour in the chain and influence the distribution of 
rewards. Understanding SSA’s past and future role as a participant in global 
value chains requires an understanding of the dynamics of global value chain 
governance, since an increasing proportion of trade in manufactures occurs 
through these coordinated and globally dispersed and disarticulated global 
value chains. 
 
In order to understand the changing nature and significance of value chain 
governance and its impact on outward oriented industrialisation in SSA, we 
need to briefly situate the pattern of emerging technological development 
during the decades of the 1970s and 1980s. By the early 1970s, post-war 
reconstruction in the industrially-advanced economies was nearly complete. 
Having their basic needs satisfied, consumers in these economies began to 
be much more demanding of product variety, product innovation and quality 
(Piore and Sabel, 1984). Associated with this was the growth in concentration 
in the retail sectors of most high-income economies, placing concentrated 
power in the hands of a limited number of global buyers (Feenstra and 
Hamilton, 2005). At the same time, reducing barriers to global trade led to 
intensified global competition in production. A significant element in meeting 
these needs of final consumers and buyers was the capacity to meet 
increasingly demanding standards, often set by the private sector and 
affecting the rules of participation of different parties in the chain. For 
example, in the auto sector, suppliers have become increasingly subject to 
detailed performance targets with regard to quality, cost and delivery. In the 
furniture sector, the Forestry Sustainability Council (FSC) accreditation 
requires all parties in the chain to be subject to conditions affecting the 
environment, bio-diversity and the respect of the needs of communities living 
in forests. In the food sector HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control 
Points) are required by all producers, as are standards affecting phytosanitary 
conditions in production and storage.  Fair-trade labour standards, too, are of 
growing significance. 
 
Hence, the major final sellers of commodities were confronted with a problem. 
On the one hand customers were becoming increasingly demanding of quality 
and variety and innovation; on the other hand, production systems were 
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becoming increasingly fragmented, diversified and geographically extended. 
How were these different forces to be reconciled? The answer was that 
production chains had to “governed”, to be coordinated in manners which 
allowed differentiated consumer needs to be met through complex and 
disarticulated production systems.  
 
In the relational global value chains, the lead firms increasingly provided 
support to suppliers over a long term in exchange for a commitment by 
suppliers to systematically cut costs (including by facilitating change in their 
own suppliers)  and to pass the gains on to the lead firms. Where this resulted 
in single-sourcing or technology-based suppliers, it was also important that 
suppliers abstained from opportunistic behaviour, so trust was key (Sako, 
1992). Supply chain management programmes were the intermediating “glue” 
which facilitated this supply chain upgrading (Bessant, Kaplinsky and 
Lamming, 2003). These supply chain management programmes are 
particularly attractive to poor economies such as those in SSA, since they 
need dual targets. They insert producers into global markets and at the same 
time they provide concrete assistance in the upgrading of SSA production 
capabilities. They provide flesh to the policy skeleton of promoting diversified 
growth through the externalities provided by industrialisation in general, and 
export-oriented production in particular. 
 
Over the past three decades there have been important developments in both 
these relational links in global value chains and in the standards which govern 
supply chain performance (Figure 2). Prior to the 1970s, exchange occurred 
either through the impersonal market or within the firm. Standards were 
largely irrelevant, particularly with regard to independent suppliers. Then, from 
the early 1970s through to the early 1990s, new forms of obligational non-
equity based durable relationships were developed, buttressed with high-trust 
and long-term supply chain management programmes and the process 
standards which drove these programmes. However, since these supply chain 
programmes were costly, they were followed initially by a separation between 
equivalent and non-equivalent relations whereby the lead-firms were prepared 
to trust their core suppliers and customers to bring their distinctive 
competences to the chain. This allowed them to concentrate their supply 
chain upgrading activities on relatively low-skilled suppliers. However, in turn, 
this gave core suppliers (some of whom in the automotive industry came to be 
called “0.5” tier suppliers, somewhere between being equal partners and first-
tier suppliers) significant power over chain governors. So in the most recent 
period, lead firms have gone back to more market-based relations with key 
suppliers, based on industry standards (Sturgeon, 2002). This enables the 
lead firms to realise product and process standards and at the same time to 
introduce more competition into their supply and customer chains. The better 
their suppliers, and the better defined chain standards, the more the chain 
governors can abstain from costly supply chain upgrading programmes. 
 
From the perspective of countries with a weak supply base, as in SSA, the 
structures prevailing in the second and third categories of governance (Figure 
6) are most attractive to the upgrading of competences. In these structures, 
the core, lead-firms have a vested interest in upgrading supplier capabilities, 
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and are interested in long-term relationships. They utilise extensive supply 
chain management programmes, either through their own efforts or by 
engaging specialised service providers. The structure predominating prior to 
the 1970s is not very attractive to these weak supply-base links in global 
value chains, since no lead party has an interest in the promotion of 
upgrading. But, similarly, t e currently emergent structure of chain governance 
is also problematic for them, since they find themselves having to compete 
with what Sturgeon has called “turnkey” or “modular” suppliers, able to work to 
industry standards without costly assistance. 
 
Figure 6. The dynamics of Value Chain Governance structures 
 
Period of 
dominance 
Governance 
structure 
Nature of chain links Importance of 
standards 
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Arms-length 
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Within firm 
Transactions costs, 
opportunistic behaviour 
 
Coordination costs 
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early 
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Arms-length 
 
 
Obligational 
 
 
Internalised 
Market 
 
 
Supply chain management 
 
 
FDI 
No 
 
 
Process standards 
 
 
Within firm 
Transactions costs, 
opportunistic behaviour 
 
Costs of support 
 
 
Lack of distinctive 
competences 
 
 
 
Mid 1980s-
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Arms length 
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  Asymmetric 
  Symmetric 
 
Internalised 
Market 
 
 
Supply chain Management 
Supply chain learning 
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Process standards 
Process standards 
 
Within firm 
Transactions costs, 
opportunistic behaviour 
 
Costs of support 
Costs of learning 
 
Lack of distinctive 
competences 
 
 
 
 
Late 1990s 
to now 
Arms length 
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   Asymmetric 
   Symmetric 
   Modular 
 
 
Internalised 
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Supply chain management 
Supply chain learning 
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FDI 
No 
 
 
Process 
and product 
standards 
 
 
Within firm 
Transactions costs, 
opportunistic behaviour 
 
Costs of support 
Costs of learning 
 
 
 
Lack of distinctive 
competences 
 
We can now turn the spotlight back from this long digression on the dynamics 
of global value chain governance to the impact of China on SSA’s export-
oriented industrialisation strategies. The point is that during the second and 
third types of value chain governance structure SSA had much to gain from 
the growing dominance of manufacturing trade through the extension of global 
value chains. In order to deliver satisfactorily to increasingly demanding and 
standards-intensive markets, the major chain governors were forced to 
upgrade their suppliers. But this was always a second best option for the lead 
firms. Supply chain management programmes can be very costly, so that the 
development of competences in China and other parts of Asia which provided 
all of the benefits of obligational supply chains without most of the costs of 
supply chain development has allowed many TNCs to wind down their supply 
chain management programmes. But this could not be done for SSA suppliers 
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who in general lack turnkey capabilities. Thus the development of capabilities 
in China, in a context of surplus manufacturing competences around the 
world, has severely restricted the incentive for TNC chain governors and 
global buyers to draw on suppliers in SSA. And it is not just that this has been 
phenomenon of the past. Perhaps more damagingly, it also affects their future 
incorporation in global value chains. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Despite the absence of data, particularly with respect to the impact of China 
on SSA manufacturing sectors targeting domestic markets, it is possible to 
draw a number of general conclusions.  
 
First, the unfolding of the Washington Consensus agenda of trade 
liberalisation and the undermining of the developmental state have had dual, 
and to some extent contradictory, impacts of undermining industrial 
production in most of SSA but at the same time upgrading the efficiency of 
those firms which have survived the competition from imports. China-sourced 
imports and their impact on SSA industrial dynamism fits into this wider 
picture. But it does so in a much more intensified form. This is because China 
competes directly in labour-intensive and low-technology industrial sectors 
which are widely seen as the stepladder for SSA’s industrial growth. This has 
had major impacts on the domestically-focused industrial sector in virtually all 
SSA economies (indeed, in fact in all global economies). 
 
Second, with regard to SSA’s export-oriented industrialisation, China’s threat 
is significant, but indirect in nature. The most obvious threat is to be seen in 
its squeezing of SSA’s clothing, textile, furniture and footwear exports in both 
the US and EU markets.4 It is important to bear in mind that these clothing 
and textiles alone represent more than half of all SSA’s manufactured exports 
(excluding South Africa). But there is a second, and more subtle impact of 
China’s growing industrial competences. This is that they are leading to a 
change in the organisation of global value chains, allowing lead chain 
governors to retreat from the supply chain upgrading which is widely 
considered to be of considerable assistance to the growth of competences in 
SSA industry. 
 
Therefore, on both counts – in domestic and in extra-SSA markets – the 
impact of China on SSA’s industrialisation appears to be harmful, both in the 
near future as well as the medium and perhaps long term future.  
 
A number of possible countervailing factors can be identified. One is that the 
heavy investments which China is making in infrastructure and in the mining 
sectors in SSA will lead to the growth of local production capacities providing 
inputs into these investments. However, at least so far, backward linkages 
from Chinese infrastructure and mining investments in SSA have been very 
                                            
4  However, it is possible that some of this threat may be diminished as consumer pressure 
grows in relation to product safety standards and “fair labour” concerns. US buyers report that 
labour conditions in African garment factories are far superior to those ins Chinese factories 
(Kaplinsky and Morris, 2008). products 
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weak, much weaker for example than those arising from investments by 
western and South African firms in the same sectors (Burke and Corkin, 
2006). A second potentially countervailing factor is the possibility that Chinese 
firms will begin to use SSA as a manufacturing base. So far there is no 
evidence of this occurring (although Indian, Sri Lankan and Taiwanese firms 
have done so in the clothing sector to take advantage of quota and AGOA 
access to the US market). In 2007 China announced a number of plans to 
facilitate such investments, but it is not clear how these Chinese-owned 
manufacturing firms can survive without overthrowing the Washington 
Consensus induced trade policy reforms introduced since the early 1990s. 
These reforms swept aside import controls, forcing SSA firms to swim in a 
very competitive sea of global producers. And, finally, it is possible that 
China’s manufacturing industry will run out of labour and productive 
capabilities, forcing its costs to rise and providing space for SSA producers to 
take its place. A note of caution is due here however. For one thing, China is 
estimated to have a reserve army of labour in excess of 150m people, with a 
total formal sector manufacturing labour force of less than 85m (Kaplinsky, 
2005). So it will be some time before it runs out of labour and before wage will 
rise significantly. For another, China is not the only low-wage industrially-
competent competitor to SSA’s industrial sector. By 2030 India will have a 
larger and younger population than China and its industrial sector is also 
growing very rapidly. It is a new threat which looms over the horizon for SSA. 
 
So, what implications does this hold for industrialisation in SSA. The brutal 
answer is that it is very difficult to see appositive future for manufacturing in 
Africa unless SSA is able to insulate its infant industries from global 
competition in general, and perhaps China (and India) in particular. This 
protection may take a regional form, both to encourage scale and competition 
(Kaplinsky, 2005). This would represent something of a retreat to an earlier 
era of import substituting industrialisation. But even if the global community 
“allowed” this retreat it is fraught with the danger of reintroducing sub-
optimum-scale plants operating in monopolistic markets. Hence it is crucially 
important that an inward-focused trade and  industrial policy of this sort 
searches for larger scale, and here the possibility arises of greater intra-
regional integration. It is worth bearing in mind here that intra-regional trade is 
globally growing more rapidly than extra-regional trade (including in Africa) 
(Evans et al, 2006) and as we saw in Section 3 above, SSA’s intra-regional 
trade is much more technology intensive than its extra-regional trade. 
Perhaps this challenge comes at a propitious time, since in the context of 
increasing imbalances in the global economy, there are growing calls for 
greater protectionism in many markets, including in the US and the EU. 
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